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Abstract
This Essay contributes to the discussion of competition law reforms, both at the level of the
European institutions and within the Member States of the European Union, by considering the
scope for altering the economic evaluation performed in the context of Article 85 of the EC Treaty.
The Essay first describes, and accounts for, the European Commission’s current interpretation of
Article 85. The Essay then presents a number of criticisms of that interpretation and assesses
possible changes to the present system of European competition enforcement. Finally, examples
are given from the case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance where a rule of
reason approach has been applied. This Essay concludes that the introduction of a rule of reason
is not only desirable but practicable within the framework of European competition rules as they
already exist.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been much recent discussion of competition law
reforms, both at the level of the European institutions and
within the Member States of the European Union.' The discus-
sion has centered upon the necessity and potential for refocus-
sing, rather than renewing, a set of rules which has been in place
for approximately forty years, and which it is felt should adapt to
the changed political and economic situation in Europe.2
This Essay contributes to that discussion by considering the
* Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Brussels. The author wishes to acknowledge
the invaluable contributions of his colleagues Fabio Casertano and Paul Laikin. A ver-
sion of this Essay will appear in 1997 FoP DHAM CORP. L. INST. (Barry Hawk ed., 1998).
Copyright © TransnationalJuris Publications, Inc. 1998.
1. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES XXVIth REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 1996, at 20, 11 (1997); J. Faull, The Future of Competition Law in the
EUM, COMPETITION WORKSHOP, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE (1997);
Patrick Massey, Reform of EC Competition Law - Substance, Procedure and Institutions, in 1996
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (Barry Hawk ed., 1997); Roger Van den Bergh, Modern Indus-
trial Organisation Versus European Competition Law, EUR. COMP. L. REv. 75, 81 (1996); M.
Waelbroeck, Do Not Give Up All Hope! Ye Who Enter, COMPETITION WORKSHOP, EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE (1997); Donald L. Holley, EEC Competition Practice: A
Thirty-Year Retrospective, in 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 669, 690-91 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1993); Barry E. Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, 32 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 973, 987-88 (1995); J. Venit, Economic Analysis, "Quick Looks" and
Article 85: A Way Forward?, COMPETITION WORKSHOP, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE,
FLORENCE (1997); Pietro Manzini, La Rule of Reason nel Diritto Comunitario della Concor-
renza: Una Analisi Giuridico-Economica [The Rule of Reason in EC Competition Law: A
Law and Economics Analysis], 31 Riv. DIR. EUROP. 859, 877-92 (1991); Helmuth R.B.
Schr6ter, Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and (3), in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
645, 691-92 (Barry Hawk ed., 1988); Alexander Schaub, Objectives and Goals of European
Competition Policy, COMPETITION WORKSHOP, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
(1997).
2. The Commission itself has identified the three main areas in which moderniza-
tion of competition policy is required. These areas are (i) a more economic analytical
approach in the appraisal of cases; (ii) improved cooperation with domestic competi-
tion authorities with a view to respecting the principle of subsidiarity; and (iii) a mod-
ernization of instruments so as to render procedures swifter and more transparent. See
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scope for altering the economic evaluation performed in the
context of Article 85 of the EC Treaty. The Essay first describes,
and briefly accounts for, the European Commission's current in-
terpretation of Article 85. The Essay then presents a number of
criticisms of that interpretation and assesses possible changes to
the present system of European competition enforcement.
The principal proposal for change concerns the introduc-
tion of a "rule of reason" approach. Under this approach, po-
tentially restrictive agreements would undergo a full economic
analysis under Article 85(1), with both pro- and anti-competitive
aspects being considered. At present, only anti-competitive as-
pects are identified under Article 85(1). The impact of pro-com-
petitive aspects of agreements is assessed only in the context of
Article 85(3). More importantly, because the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to exempt under Article 85(3), the Com-
mission alone, at present, is perceived to be empowered to pass
judgment on the overall competitive impact of agreements.
The new approach would lead to a substantial reduction in
the number of notifications to the Commission. This is because
agreements that are not seriously restrictive of competition, but
that do contain anti-competitive elements, would no longer nec-
essarily be subject to notification. In this connection, several im-
provements to competition procedure are also suggested.
Finally, by way of contrast to the Commission's approach de-
scribed at the beginning of this Essay, examples are given from
the case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First In-
stance where a rule of reason approach has been applied. This
Essay concludes that the introduction of a rule of reason is not
only desirable but practicable within the framework of European
competition rules as they already exist.
I. CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 85
A. The Commission's Approach
Procedurally, only the Commission can apply Article 85(3)
of the EC Treaty, whereas both the Commission and national
courts and/or authorities can apply Article 85(1).' Substan-
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
1996, at 20, 11 (1997).
3. Article 9(1) of Regulation 17/62, implementing Article 85, provides that only
the Commission can grant exemptions: "Subject to review of its decision by the Court
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tively, a fundamental choice was made as to the application of
Article 85 early in the development of European competition
law, and, in particular, as to the respective roles of paragraphs
(1) and (3) of that provision. The Commission decided that,
under Article 85(1), any restriction of the commercial freedom
of one or more of the parties to an agreement would amount to
a restriction of competition. It therefore decided that under Ar-
ticle 85(1) there would be no examination of the overall eco-
nomic impact of an agreement, nor of whether any competitive
benefits provided by the agreement would be possible without
the restriction. The practical consequence of this substantive in-
terpretation is that the Commission's initial finding has almost
invariably been that agreements containing any restrictive ele-
ment are anti-competitive. Thus Article 85(1) has been inter-
preted in a " literal, almost mathematical, manner,"4 despite rec-
ognition by the Commission that much conduct caught by the
broad sweep of the provision, as so interpreted, is in fact accepta-
ble.5
Only in the context of Article. 85(3) has the Commission
usually tried to balance pro- and anti-competitive effects, and to
make an assessment of the overall competitive impact of the
agreement on the freedom of undertakings to determine their
commercial behavior and/or the possible merits of the agree-
ment in furthering other Treaty objectives. The Commission
does not deny that agreements may be commendable in their
effect and intentions. However, it insists that the analysis should
first. determine that restrictions of competition exist and then
approve them.
Early and important evidence of the Commission's tenden-
cies is provided in Sociiti Technique Minire,6 where it set out its
of Justice, the Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable
pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty." Commission Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(1),
O.J. L 204/62, at 87 (1962). By contrast, Article 85(1) "create[s] direct rights in respect
of the individuals concerned which the national court must safeguard." Belgische Ra-
dio en Televisie v. SV Sabam, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R 51, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238.
4. Ian Forrester & Christopher Norall, The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help
and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied, COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 11, 12 (1984).
5. See Alberto Pera & Mario Todino, Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: Need for a
Reform, in (1996) FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST., 125 (Barry Hawk ed., 1997).
6. Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235,
[1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
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basic view of what amounts to a restriction. Before the Court of
Justice, the Commission argued that a restriction on competition.
arises when the freedom of action of the contracting parties is
limited, and when the position of a third party is adversely af-
fected.7 This concept has been adhered to by the Commission
ever since.8 It has been stated that "clearly the Commission
does not go far in the interpretation of the phrase 'restriction'."9
Indeed, one can go so far. as to affirm that the Commission's
current approach to Article 85 is "formalistic and restrictive,"' 0
its main consequence being that all potentially anti-competitive
agreements require notification. 1
An example of the Commission's approach may be found in
the Re Davidson Rubber decision.' 2 In that case, Davidson had
granted three separate licenses to manufacturers in three Mem-
ber States. Davidson agreed with each licensee to grant no other
license in the licensee's territory without its consent, and each
licensee agreed not to sell outside its territory. The Commission
initially found that the agreement was caught by Article 85(1),
only to exempt it subsequently under Article 85(3), on the
7. Id. at 240, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 357.
8. An interesting formulation appears in the Commission's argument to the Court
of Justice in Consten and Grundig v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966]
E.C.R. 299,377, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
The decisive criterion for the coming into force of the prohibition mentioned
in Article 85(1) . . . consists of the finding that the agreement interferes with
the freedom of action of one of the parties or with the position of third parties
on the market not only in a theoretical but also in a perceptible manner.
Consten & Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 377, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 418. Ian Forrester ob-
serves that
this cannot mean exactly what it says, since any agreement by its very nature
limits the freedom of action of the parties.... It is clear that the Commission
intended to cast the net of Article 85(1) very broadly, adding the rider about
perceptibility or "appreciableness" to exclude de minimis situations.
Forrester & Norall, supra note 4, at 11. The Commission also stated, in relation to an
exclusive copyright license, that "these are typical restrictions on freedom of economic
action which generally fall within the scope of Article 85 (1)." Coditel SA, Compagnie
G~n6rale pour la Diffusion de la T16vision v. Cin6-Vog Films SA, Case 262/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 3381, 3389, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49.
9. Christopher Bright, Deregulation of EC Competition Policy: Rethinking Article 85(1),
in 1994 FoRDHAm CORP. L. INST. 505, 514 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
10. Pera & Todino, supra note 5, at 125.
11. In 1996, the Commission received 209 notifications pursuant to Article 85, but
only 21 formal decisions were adopted. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1996, at 50, 110 (1997).
12. Commission Decision No. 72/328/EEC, O.J. L 143/39 (1972).
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grounds that without the protection of exclusive manufacturer
licenses, the Davidson technology would not have become avail-
able in Europe.
This approach was applied by the Commission until the
Court's decision in the Nungesser case.13 In Nungesser, the Court
of Justice ruled that "open" exclusive licensing agreements,
where the licensor undertakes not to exploit the licensed inven-
tion in the licensed territory himself, and not to grant further
licences there, are not by themselves incompatible with Article
85(1), provided that they concern the introduction and protec-
tion of new technology in the licensed territory. Through this
approach, the Court acknowledged the importance of the re-
search undertaken, and risk involved, in manufacturing and
marketing a new product, and made it clear that it did not con-
sider open exclusive licensing agreements which fulfilled these
conditions to fall within the scope of Article 85(1).
Two years after Nungesser, the Commission adopted the Pat-
ent Licence Regulation. 4 Article 1 of the Regulation provides
that all open exclusive licensing agreements are exempted. This
has blurred the distinction between open exclusive licenses re-
lated to the introduction and protection of a new technology,
that were deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 85(1), and
other open exclusive licenses which were not. This distinction is
recognized by the Commission in the Preamble to the Regula-
tion. 15
13. L.C. Nungesser KG & Kurt Eisele v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278.
14. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15 (1984), amended by Com-
mission Regulation No.151/93, O.J. L 21/8 (1993).
15. Paragraph 11 of the Preamble states that
Exclusive licensing agreements,, i.e. agreements in which the licensor under-
takes not to exploit the 'licensed invention', i.e. the licensed patented inven-
tion and any know-how communicated to the licensee, in the licensed territory
himself and not to grant further licences there, are not in themselves incom-
patible with Article 85(1) where they are concerned with the introduction and
protection of a new technology in the licensed territory, by reason of the scale
of the research which has been undertaken and of the risk that is involved in
manufacturing and marketing a product which is unfamiliar to users in the
licensed territory at the time the agreement is made. This may also be the
case where the agreements are concerned with the introduction and protec-
tion of a new process for manufacturing a product which is already known. In
so far as in other cases agreements of this kind may fall within the scope of
Article 85(1) it is useful for the purposes of legal certainty to include them in
Article 1, in order that they may also benefit from the exemption. However,
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B. Reasons for the Current Approach
The current approach was adopted for three main reasons.
First, in the early stages of European integration, Member States,
apart from France and Germany, were unfamiliar with competi-
tion rules. Interpreting Article 85 in a formalistic manner meant
that the Commission could exercise control over the interpreta-
tion and development of those rules. Second, it was considered
easier to achieve the completion of the Single Market by deem-
ing all agreements between undertakings to be prima facie anti-
competitive, than by removing the necessity of Commission noti-
fication in those cases where pro-competitive benefits out-
weighed anti-competitive effects. This was most important in the
context of vertical agreements that have traditionally been con-
sidered capable of segmenting markets into national and re-
gional zones. Third, the approach was justified by the initial dif-
ficulty, due again to unfamiliarity with competition rules, of
making a full market analysis in each case. None of these rea-
sons now apply.
1. Initial Unfamiliarity with Competition Rules
When the EC Treaty came into force, there was relatively
little experience of competition law enforcement in Europe.
France and Germany were the only Member States with laws re-
lating to competition and their laws were very different. Ger-
many was concerned mainly about horizontal agreements,
whereas France treated vertical restrictions more severely than
horizontal ones. The usefulness of a wide competence in these
circumstances was clear. Formalism represented a tool to ensure
centralized control of the enforcement of EC competition rules
by the Commission.16 The Commission hoped to ensure the
uniform application of the competition rules through its exclu-
sive power to exempt. The Commission could use this power as
the basis to review, assess, and identify the real issues of concern.
The low jurisdictional threshold of Article 85(1) arguably served
the exemption of exclusive licensing agreements and certain export bans im-
posed on the licensor and the licensees is without prejudice to subsequent
developments in the case law of the Court of Justice regarding the status of
such agreements under Article 85(1). Commission Regulation No. 2343/84,
O.J. L 219/16 (1984), amended by Commission Regulation No. 151/93, O.J. L
21/8 (1993).
16. See Pera & Todino, supra note 5, at 125.
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a purpose in laying the foundations of the Community's law in
relation to anti-competitive agreements. Moreover, this solution
assured maximum disclosure to the Commission of business
practices as they actually existed, and a maximum role for the
Commission in deciding whether such practices were acceptable
and legal.
While unfamiliarity with competition law may have been an
explanation for starting with this approach, it does not consti-
tute a reason to continue with it. After almost forty years of ex-
perience with Article 85, the Commission's competition order is
near to maturity. Moreover, practically all EC Member States
have passed antitrust legislation at the national level, and have
set up national competition enforcement authorities. National
antitrust legislation is strongly inspired by EC competition rules.
Thus, even if an overly-wide jurisdiction competence could have
been justified in the early years, it no longer can be.
2. Completion of the Single Market
Another supposed justification for the Commission's pres-
ent approach to Article 85(1) was the formerly dominant objec-
tive of European competition law, namely the establishment of
the internal market. European competition law is one of the few
systems of competition law - or maybe the only system - hav-
ing a market integration goal, besides the goal of promoting
competition. This emphasis on promoting and protecting Euro-
pean integration was especially important in the earlier stages of
integration when the danger that private agreements might seg-
ment the market into national and regional markets was viru-
lent.17
Due to the perception that these agreements harmed the
economic integration of Member States, the Commission placed
a special emphasis on vertical relationships when enforcing anti-
trust rules, thus condemning a variety of agreements between
manufacturers and distributors designed to protect national
17. "European competition law is an instrument for achieving a free flow of goods,
services, persons and capital, i.e. the necessary precondition for establishing the inter-
nal market (integration function) and is a goal in itself, protecting and promoting free
competition in the emerging internal European market (competition function)."
Christian Kirchner, European Competition Law: Proposal for Change, in COMPETITION
WORKSHOP, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE (1997).
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markets."8 While a number of objections have been raised to
this approach, until recently those objections have had little im-
pact on the attitude of the Commission. Integration considera-
tions have continued to be one of the dominant concerns in the
enforcement of Article 85.
Logically, however, the realization of the internal market in
1992 affected the appropriateness of the integration aim as the
dominant goal of competition policy. Accordingly, it is submit-
ted that the integration argument must be replaced by an exclu-
sively economic assessment of the effects on competition,
thereby shifting the weight into the direction of the competition
function. Antitrust law is today essentially applied in order to
ensure that competition in the internal market remains in a
healthy state. 9
Moreover, there is no longer a need for the Commission to
maintain such a formalistic and restrictive attitude towards verti-
cal relations. Indeed, many have considered it questionable
whether vertical restraints really hinder or prevent market inte-
gration at all. 20 Furthermore, the Commission itself, in its Green
Paper on vertical restraints, 21 seems ready to narrow the scope of
Article 85(1) and to shift the economic appraisal of arrange-
ments from Article 85(3) to Article 85(1).22 Commissioner Van
Miert himself has recently declared that:
18. See, e.g., Consten and Grundig v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64,
[1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418; Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin, Case 23/67,
[1973] E.C.R. 77, [1973] C.M.L.R. 287; Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977]
E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1; Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission, Case 210/81,
[1983] E.C.R. 3045, [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 69; Procureur de Ia Republique v. Giry and
Guerlain, Case 253/78, [1980] E.C.R. 2327, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 99.
19. Rein Wesseling, The Commission Notices on Decentralization of E. C. Antitrust Law:
In For a Penny, Not For a Pound, 18 EUR. COMP. L. REv., 94 (1997).
20. See VALENTINE KORA, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE, (5th ed. 1994); See
also F. Carlin, Vertical Restraints: Time for Change?, 17 EUR. COMP. L. Rrv., 283 (1996).
21. Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, COM (96) 721 (1996) [hereinafter Green
Paper].
22. Option IV is as follows
As a response to criticisms that the current block exemption have has a strait-
jacket effect and that Article 85(1) has been applied too widely to vertical re-
straints without reference to their economic and market context, this option
proposes the introduction of a rebuttable presumption of compatibility with
Article 85(1) (the "negative clearance presumption") for parties with a market
share of less than 20%. This negative clearance presumption could be imple-
mented by a Commission notice and subsequently, in the light of experience
acquired, within the framework of a negative clearance regulation.
Id. at 78, 293.
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as the single market becomes a reality, a shift in emphasis is
taking place in the application of Article 85. In the past,
more attention was given to the legal vetting of contractual
clauses which might have restricted the freedom of trade and
consequently impeded the development of a single market.
This was the reason for the great importance attached to ver-
tical restrictions. But as time goes on, a more and more struc-
tural approach is emerging .... In handling individual cases
we must be careful that the competitive structure of markets
does not suffer.23
3. The Difficulty of Making a Market Analysis in Individual
Cases
Finally, the Commission may initially have been influenced
by the difficulty of making a market analysis in each case, both
for lawyers advising businessmen, and for its officials dealing
with particular cases. As one commentator has noted "it is easier
mechanically to point to clauses that restrict someone's conduct;
then, the Commission is free to make a complex economic as-
sessment under Article 85(3) in those cases it investigates in
depth. '24 Given the now considerable experience of making
market analyses in the enforcement of competition rules, such
an argument is clearly no longer valid.
II. CRITICISMS OF THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH
Further criticisms of the Commission's current approach
can be made. These are that the formalistic interpretation of
Article 85(1) exerts an excessive compliance burden on under-
takings, discourages commercial innovation by undertakings,
and creates a huge and unmanageable workload for the Com-
mission.
A. Excessive Compliance Burden
As noted above, the result of the Commission's current ap-
proach is that even agreements with little or no risk of being
economically anti-competitive are deemed unenforceable if they
23. K. Van Miert, Opening Speech to the EG-Kartellrechtsforum des Studienvereinigung
Kartellrecht (Brussels, May 11, 1995).
24. Valentine Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity - The Need for a Rule of
Reason in EEC Antitrust, Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 320, 348-49 (1981) [hereinafter Rise and
Fall].
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have not been notified. Companies may have a formal choice of
whether to notify an agreement and thereby obtain an exemp-
tion, but they have nonetheless to be concerned about the con-
sequences of Article 85(2) on the validity of the agreement. By
reducing the threshold for the application of Article 85(1) to a
very low level, the effect of Article 85(2) has been to induce com-
panies to notify a large number of agreements not having seri-
ous restrictive effects. This process requires advice, and has a
real cost for the parties. Because the Commission has no en-
forcement interest in many cases falling within Article 85 (1), the
heavy compliance burden on companies cannot be justified. It
has been noted that
a substantial proportion of the compliance costs has little to
do with safeguarding effective competition. Costs are in-
curred by business in ensuring the conformity of innocuous
agreements with formalistic wide-ranging rules, and in deal-
ing with cumbersome administrative procedures. Competi-
tion law applicable to business is therefore a priority area for
administrative simplification, i.e. the removal, of unnecessary'
burdens and the limiting of regulation to matters of genuine
economic importance.25
In sum, many companies and lawyers continue to notify
agreements whenever there is a possibility that they might in-
fringe Article 85(1), simply because (i) a truthful notification
confers immunity from fines; 26 and (ii) if a contractual provision
is ever challenged in litigation, by way of claims of unenforce-
ability or for damages, it is thought that a party to such an agree-
ment is in a stronger position, if the agreement has been noti-
fled. Thus, on those occasions when the competition rules are
invoked before national courts, the argument that an agreement
is acceptable because it has been notified is not infrequently
made.27
25. UNICE, Modernising EU Competition Policy: Re-Focusing the Scope and Administra-
tion of Article 85 and Reform of State Aid Control, 11-12 (June 28, 1996) [hereinafter
Modernising EU Competition Policy]..
26. Article 15(5) of Regulation 17/62, states that "the fines provided for in para-
graph 2(a) shall not be imposed in respect of acts taking place: (a) after notification to
the Commission and before its decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty,
provided they fall within the limits of the activity described in the notification . .. "
Commission Regulation No. 17/62, art. 15(5), O.J. L.204/62 , at 91, (1962).
27. Forrester & Norall, supra note 4, at 11, 41-45.
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B. Discouragement of Commercial Innovation
The Commission's practice of only making a market analysis
under Article 85(3), and not under Article 85(1), may discour-
age firms from implementing projects involving substantial sunk
costs.
2 8
C. Huge Commission Workload
As noted, an enormous number of agreements have been
considered at least prima facie unenforceable despite the fact
that they contain more pro- than anti-competitive elements, and
are highly likely to be exempted under Article 85(3). The availa-
bility of exemptions is thus indispensable for the system to func-
tion as it was designed. Yet, the current formalistic approach, by
encouraging recourse to individual exemptions, has resulted in a
huge workload for the Commission's staff. Cases take years to
move forward and "remain indefinitely in a kind of limbo. '29
Only a few specific exemptions are issued each year.3 °
Thus, a structural discordance exists between the asserted
jurisdictional reach of the Commission and its administrative ca-
pacity to deliver the legal certainty for which its theory creates a
need."1 The large number of notifications is consistent with the
logic of the system, but also contributes to its unworkability. 32
Moreover, the Commission's excessive workload has meant that
28. Margot Horspool & Valentine Korah, Competition, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 337
(1992). Horspool and Korah stated that "the Commission has tended to perceive the
agreement ex post, after investments were made, and not ex ante when parties were nego-
tiating their agreements, and each needed to insure that he would reap any harvest
resulting from his investment." Id. at 347. "The parties need to know when they are
negotiating the contract and committing themselves to incurring sunk costs that the
contractual provisions will be enforceable." Id. at 355.
29. Id. at 358.
30. In 1996, DG-IV registered 471 new cases, including 209 notifications, 168 com-
plaints, and 94 cases opened on the Commission's own initiative. COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1996, at 50, 1 110
(1997). The European Commission noted that "although the number of new cases is
lower than in 1995, it exceeds the average number of incoming cases over the last nine
years by more than 10%. In 1996 notifications were sharply down, whereas complaints
and own-initiative proceedings showed a substantial increase." Id. at 38-39. During
1996, the Commission closed 386 cases, of which 365 ended informally, such as by com-
fort/discomfort letter, rejection of complaint without a decision, or administrative clo-
sure of the file, and only 21 by formal decision. Id. '
31. Ian Forrester, Competition Structures for the 21st Century, in 1994 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 445 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
32. Forrester & Norall, supra note 4, at 14; Christopher Bright, Deregulation of EC
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it has not been able to concentrate on important and politically
sensitive cases. 33 Many serious restrictions of competition there-
fore escape the Commission's attention because of its excessive
focus on cases having only minor restrictive consequences.
Finally, with increased deregulation of nationalized indus-
tries and the completion of the internal market, the Commission
workload is likely to increase further as whole sectors, such as
telecommunications, energy, or postal services are fully subject
to the application of the competition rules. Introducing compe-
tition necessarily means enlarging the scope of state aids rules to
these sectors. Otherwise, the new competitive environment
would be hampered from the outset by severe distortions of
competition. The number of cases dealt with by the Commis-
sion has tripled within a period of eight years. Parallel to the
increased number of cases, the Commission has also observed an
increase in the complexity of the cases dealt with. On the other
hand, the overall number of DG-IV staff dealing with State aid
cases has remained relatively stable in the same period.
Block exemption regulations under Article 94 of the EC
Treaty could contribute to a reinforced State aid policy. Such
regulations would exempt certain categories of aid, by way of
block exemptions, from the notification obligation, and would
cover aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as cer-
tain types of aid for research and development, employment,
training, and environmental protection. Moreover, such regula-
tions would provide a safe legal basis -for the de minimis rule in
the field of State aids. 4
D. Commission's Failed Attempts to Reduce its Workload
The Commission is well aware of the necessity of resolving
the shortfalls of the current system. Indeed, since the mid-
1970s, wave after wave of initiatives have aimed at doing just that.
However, none of the attempts by the Commission to improve
the system have been successful. In particular, group exemption
regulations have led to a loss of flexibility; comfort letters lack
Competition Policy: Rethinking Article 85 (1), in 1994 FOPDHAM CORP. L. INST. 505, 514
(Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
33. See Mario Siragusa, Future Competition Policy, COMPETITION WORKSHOP, EURO-
PEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE (1997).
34. WOLFGANG MEDERER, The Future of State Aid Control, COMPETITION POuCv NEWS-
LETTER 12 (1996).
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legal certainty; and decentralization attempts have been ineffec-
tive, due to the limited enforcement powers granted to national
courts and authorities.
1. Loss of Flexibility Through Group Exemption Regulations
The Commission has tried to overcome its inability to grant
many individual exemptions by granting group exemptions for
specified classes of agreements." Block exemption regulations
solve some problems, but often their terms are too rigid and
their scope of application is limited. For instance, the exemp-
tion for exclusive distribution applies only where goods are sup-
plied for resale and not to the distribution of services. Thus,
compliance with the terms of a group exemption frequently en-
tails a substantial loss of flexibility which may be regarded as un-
desirable. Unfortunately, each of the block exemptions applies
to only a narrow class of contracts. The tailoring of agreements
to fit into a block exemption may lead to the ossification of con-
tractual structures.36
2. Lack of Legal Certainty Through Comfort Letters
The Commission has also attempted to find a solution by
issuing comfort letters. In practice, most files are closed by a
letter, stating that the Commission thinks that the agreement
does not restrict competition, often owing to the small market
shares of the parties. The Court of Justice has ruled that a com-
35. The following block exemption regulations have been adopted: Commission
Regulation No. 1983/83, O.J. L 173/1 (1983) (concerning distribution agreements),
Commission Regulation No. 1984/83, O.J. L 173/5 (1983) (concerning exclusive
purchasing agreements), Commission Regulation No. 417/85, O.J. L 53/1 (1985) (con-
cerning specialization agreements), Commission Regulation No. 418/85, Oj. L 53/12
(1985) (concerning R&D agreements), Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, OJ. L
353/46 (1988) (concerning franchise agreements), Commission Regulation No. 1475/
95, OJ. L 145/25 (1985) (concerning motor vehicle distribution and servicing agree-
ments), Commission Regulation No. 240/96, Oj. L 31/2 (1996) (concerning technol-
ogy transfer agreements).
36. Horspool and Korah note that
the drawback of proceeding by regulating agreements through providing
group exemptions is that some agreements are distorted by the parties to
come within them and be enforceable without improving the fairness or effi-
ciency of the economy. Those who pay substantial sums to obtain good advice
may select the group exemption that requires the least distortion to the agree-
ment, Smaller firms, obtaining less sophisticated advice, may find they cannot
enforce important parts of their agreements.
Horspool & Korah, supra note 27, at 357.
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fort letter may be taken into account by a national court asked to
enforce the agreement, but does not bind it. 7 Indeed, the prin-
cipal disadvantage of comfort letters is that they have no legal
effect. If an undertaking accepts a comfort letter, there is always
the risk that, at some point in the future, the benefit of the com-
fort letter will be removed.3 8 Finally, a comfort letter stating that
the agreement merits exemption, but that the Commission is
closing its file, implies that the agreement infringes Article
85(1), otherwise, it would not need exemption.39 This type of
comfort letter creates legal uncertainty.
3. Limited Enforcement Powers of National Courts
In view of its limited resources and the increasing number
of cases, the Commission has also tried to decentralize the en-
forcement of EC antitrust law. To this end, the Commission has,
for many years, encouraged civil actions before national courts,
thus in theory enabling it to devote its resources to cases involv-
ing cross-border transactions. Two Court judgments40 lend sup-
port to the Commission's campaign for greater private enforce-
ment at the national level.
Decentralization is a logical consequence of the growing im-
portance of the concept of subsidiarity.41 In the context of EC
competition law, subsidiarity means that cases in which the Com-
munity has an important economic, political, or legal interest
should be handled by the Commission, while national authori-
ties should deal with agreements or practices affecting only na-
37. Procureur de la R~publique v. Giry and Guerlain, Case 253/78, [1980] E.C.R.
2328; Valentine Korah, Comfort Letters - Reflections on the Perfume Cases, EUR. L. REv., 14,
38-39 (1981). According to the Commission, a national court may consider a comfort
letter stating that the agreement being litigated before it merits exemption "as a factual
element." Commission Notice, Oj. C 39/6 (1993) (concerning cooperation with
courts).
38. Rise and Fall, supra note 23, at 334; ModernisingEU Competition Policy, supra note
24, at 12.
39. Modernising EU Competition Policy, supra note 25, at 12.
40. Delimitis v. Henninger Brhu, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 210.
41. "Subsidiarity" is defined in Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union.
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, art. 3, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987)).
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tional markets.
42
However, attempts at decentralization fall far short of the
required degree of reform. As noted above, the broad and legal-
istic interpretation of Article 85(1) transfers the economic analy-
sis of antitrust cases to Article 85(3). The application of Article
85(3) implies the exercise of considerable discretionary power.
As noted also, pursuant to Article 9(3) of Regulation 17, only the
Commission enjoys such discretion. Consequently, at present,
the Commission itself is exclusively qualified to enforce EC com-
petition law comprehensively. Thus, in the present circum-
stances increased cooperation with national courts and authori-
ties does not seriously resolve the Commission's overload prob-
lem.
III. THE RULE OF REASON AND PROCEDURAL
IMPROVEMENTS
The adoption of a rule of reason approach in the assess-
ment of agreements in the European competition law context,
together with various accompanying procedural improvements,
may constitute a solution to many of the problems discussed
above.
A. Rule of Reason Approach
A relaxation of the interpretation of Article 85(1) is needed
to increase the number of cases where economic behavior can
be said to comply with Article 85, without it being necessary to
resort to Article 85(3). Under the rule of reason, a full competi-
tive balance would be made in the context of Article 85(1).4
Agreements containing restrictions would be evaluated through
an appreciability test. The appreciability test would make it pos-
sible to balance pro- and anti-competitive elements of commer-
cial agreements. When the anti-competitive elements were out-
weighed, agreements would not be caught by Article 85(1), and
would not require notification to the Commission.4 4
How would such a rule of reason be applied in practice? It
is clear that a redrafting of the Treaty competition rules is not
only a politically controversial proposition, but would be entirely
42. Ivo Van Bael, The Role of National Courts, 1 EUR. CoMp. L. REv. 3 (1994).
43. Pera & Todino, supra note 5, at 125.
44. Modernising EU Competition Policy, supra note 25, at 12.
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unnecessary. Article 85 is drafted broadly enough to allow the
Commission and the Court of Justice to bring about important
changes in the current application of EC competition law, with-
out departing from the existing framework. Moreover, because
Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty mirrors section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which is interpreted by means of a rule of reason approach,
there is in principle no reason why it should not be similarly
interpreted.
Thus, these changes may be achieved through a gradual
shift in the Commission's economic appraisal of agreements
from Article 85(3) to Article 85(1). Such a shift could begin
with a different approach to the application of the phrase "pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition" in Article
85(1). Before deciding that a given restriction of competition
was illegal, the Commission would (i) assess whether such com-
petition could exist at all; and (ii) carry out an economic balance
of the agreement's positive and negative market effects, for ex-
ample, by considering whether a firm benefiting from exclusivity
would have found it worthwhile to make an investment, in the
absence of such exclusivity.
B. The Residual Role of the Exemption Process Under Article 85(3)
In the context of the proposed system, the role of Article
85(3) would change. Article 85(3) exemptions would be applied
only in cases involving political issues, so that agreements or
practices that are deemed restrictive on pure antitrust grounds
would be authorized where "redeeming virtues" of industrial,45
regional, social, 46 or environmental policy were found to out-
weigh the detrimental impact of the cooperation or collusion
45. Industrial policy considerations, such as the development and dissemination of
new technologies throughout the Community or the competitiveness of European in-
dustries, have been taken into account, to some extent, by the Commission in its deci-
sions concerning specialization agreements. See e.g. Commission Decision No. 72/231/
EEC, O.J. L 182/24 (1972) (Fine Paper); Commission Decision No. 84/387 /EEC, OJ.
L 212/1 (1984) (BPLC/ICI); Commission Decision No. 87/3/EEC, O.J. L 5/13 (1987)
(ENI/Montedison); Commission Decision No. 76/249/EEC, O.J. L 51/15 (1976)
(KEWA); Commission Decision No. 77/781/EEC, O.J. L 327/26 (1977) (GEC-Weir
Sodium Circulators).
46. Employment problems have played a limited role in crisis cartel cases. See e.g.,
Commission Decision No. 84/380/EEC, O.J. L 207/17 (1984) (Synthetic Fibers). See
also Commission Regulation No. 1475/95, arts. 5(2)(2)-(3) and 8(2), O.J. L 145/25
(1995) (including, in context of block exemption for motor vehicle distribution and
servicing agreements, provisions covering matters of social, fiscal, and industrial policy,
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between the parties.47
However, individual exemptions would still be subject to the
two-fold condition that the agreement neither (i) imposes on
the parties restrictions which are not indispensable to the attain-
ment of the non-competition objectives mentioned above, nor
(ii) affords them the possibility of eliminating competition in
the relevant market.48 Moreover, because an exemption under
Article 85(3) is limited in time, restrictions of competition con-
sidered indispensable to achieve industrial, regional, social, or
environmental policy objectives would be eliminated at the end
of the period for which the exemption has been granted.
C. Advantages of the Proposed System
The introduction of a rule of reason approach would have
numerous advantages. First, conducting a market analysis
before finding that Article 85(1) is infringed would mean that
agreements which do not in fact restrict any competition, or any
competition that would be possible without the agreement,
could be made, knowing that they would be enforceable. This
would enable businessmen to place incentives where they should
be. Reducing the need for prior notification of pro-competitive
agreements would alleviate the excessive compliance burden on
undertakings discussed above and allow the Commission, as
noted, to concentrate on important and politically sensitive
cases.
Second, the proposed change would be helpful from the
point of view of the decentralized enforcement of Community
competition law. It would facilitate the application of substan-
tive competition provisions by national courts. In cases where a
national court was confronted with a notified agreement, that
court would no longer be obliged to await the Commission's de-
cision or informal comfort letter, but could decide on its own
that Article 85 (1), correctly construed, was inapplicable.
Third, applying a rule of reason approach would have the
advantage of a concomitant reduction in the Commission's abil-
such as required notice period to be given when dealer is dismissed, and harmonization
of car prices throughout European Union).
47. Siragusa, supra note 32, at 13-14.
48. Examples of exemptions include where the parties to an agreement have negli-
gible market power or, though holding significant positions within the EU market, face
substantial competitive pressure from non-EC competitors.
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ity to exercise universal surveillance over all questionable cases.
In many cases, national courts and authorities are perfectly com-
petent to make a competition assessment, and there is no reason
for the Commission to intervene.
Fourth, the proposed system would have the effect of im-
proving judicial review of competition decisions. In fact, deci-
sions adopted by the Commission under Article 85(1) are easier
to judicially review than decisions rendered under Article 85(3),
which imply the exercise of a broad discretionary power by the
Commission.
Finally, this new approach would be beneficial to the devel-
opment of market arrangements, no longer constrained to the
standardization imposed by block exemption regulations. This
would be because less agreements would be caught by Article
85(1), and therefore require tailoring to fit the terms of block
exemption regulations.
D. The Adoption of a "Rule of Reason" Approach by the Italian
Antitrust Authority
A "rule of reason" approach not dissimilar from the one
proposed in this Essay has been applied by the Italian Antitrust
Authority ("IAA") in its practice in application of Articles 2 and
4 of Law No. 287/1990 of October 10, 1990. The Italian provi-
sions correspond to Article 85(1) and 85(3) of the Treaty, re-
spectively. The IAA has described its approach in the following
terms:
Consistently with the Community approach, the Authority has
stated that, after an agreement is found to have a restrictive
object, an assessment of the restrictive nature of its effect is
not necessary for purposes of establishing a violation of Arti-
cle 2(2) of Law No. 287/90, since the two prerequisites laid
down in this provision are alternative .... As a qualification
to the above, however .... it cannot be ruled out that, even if
an agreement is found to have a restrictive object, the analysis
of its effects, as a possible indicator of the agreement's restric-
tive nature with respect to the structure of the relevant mar-
ket, may become appropriate. The agreement's effects may
become relevant for the purpose of establishing possible ex-
ternal factors, which must be taken into account in the whole
assessment, with particular respect to the agreement's ap-
preciability. Under the settled case law of Court of Justice,
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the effects of an agreement must be assessed in its legal and
economic context. Therefore, the way in which market rela-
tionships would have developed in the absence of the agree-
ment in question must be taken into account; furthermore,
the agreement must be assessed jointly with any other similar
agreements existing in the same market. Where scrutiny of
an agreement's effects appears necessary, an economic analy-
sis of the markets, which must take into account such ele-
ments as the existence of intellectual property rights, the ex-
isting degree of competition and the competitors' reaction to
the agreement's effects, will thus be indispensable.4 9
E. Procedural Improvements
In the context of the new system, a number of measures
could be adopted in order to increase the role of national courts
in the enforcement of EC competition rules, free the Commis-
sion to concentrate its energies effectively, and aid the practical
application of the rule of reason approach. These procedural
improvements fall into four main categories: (i) guidelines and
Notices; (ii) block negative clearances; (iii) improved coopera-
tion between the Commission and national courts and authori-
ties; and (iv) further development of the informal settlement of
cases.
1. Guidelines and Notices
The implementation of the rule of reason approach de-
scribed above could be supported by explanatory and illustrative
guidelines drawn up by the Commission and published in a new
Notice. Such guidelines would assist both businessman and law-
yers in determining whether agreements required individual ex-
emption, or fell outside the scope of Article 85(1). The guide-
lines could, in practice, be based on certain existing Commission
communications, particularly the Notices on cooperation be-
tween enterprises, subcontracting agreements, and exclusive
dealing contracts with commercial agents, as well as the Green
Paper on vertical restraints. Further guidelines concerning the
methods for applying the appreciability test to cooperation
agreements could be added to the existing Notices.
49. AUTORITA GARANTE DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEL MERCATO, RELAZIONE ANNUALE
SULL'ATrnvTA SVOLTA 1994 [1994 Annual Report] 129 (1995).
RETHINKING ARTICLE 85
Even this approach would not resolve all uncertainty, and so
increased flexibility in the interpretation of Article 85(1) should
be accompanied by an expansion of the scope of the Notice on
agreements of minor importance, and by removing certain fur-
ther classes of agreement from the necessity of notification.
50
2. Block Negative Clearances
One of the principal objectives of introducing a rule of rea-
son approach is to achieve a decrease in the number of notifica-
tions of agreements or practices to DG-IV. The likelihood of
such a result being achieved would be significantly enhanced if
private parties were able to rely, before European and national
courts and competition authorities, upon block negative clear-
ances. Block negative clearances would take the form of official
acts that the Commission, on the basis of its individual casework,
would produce and publish for the purpose of aiding in the pro-
posed new approach to the interpretation of Article 85 (1). Such
clearances would have the effect of clarifying and reducing the
perceived scope of Article 85 in those areas where no policy is-
sues arise.
As to the form that such block negative clearances would
take, the Notices issued by the Commission thus far are merely
an expression of its thinking in abstract terms, and do not preju-
dice its power to depart from them in individual cases. Notices
bind neither European nor national courts. They are, therefore,
unable to provide a desired level of certainty for businessmen or
their lawyers. Any future explanations of the Commission's pol-
icy in the application of the rule of reason will amount to simple
communications, having no binding legal effect, unless the Com-
mission is empowered by the Council of Ministers to adopt
group negative clearances in the form of regulations. 1
In practical terms, the Commission's recent publication of a
Green Paper on vertical restraints - which is intended to form
the basis for consultation with Member States, other EU institu-
tions, and business, and to be followed by a white paper selecting
the best policy option - could serve as a model in other areas of
50. See Modernising EU Competition Policy, supra note 25, at 12.
51. This is pursuant to Article 87 of the Treaty, as it was the case for the adoption
of Article 85(3) regulations. See Council Regulation No. 19/65, 36J.0. 533/65 (1965),
OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-1966, at 35.
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application of Article 85(1). Moreover, because a number of
group exemptions under Article 85(3) are due to expire
shortly,12 in the first phase of the new enforcement system based
on the rule of reason, the development of new Commission No-
tices could be planned to coincide with the adoption of renewed
block exemptions. The "white lists" of provisions deemed rarely
to infringe Article 85(1) would be longer in the new group ex-
emptions than under the original regulations. 3 The Commis-
sion, however, should not place clauses on the white list in an
indiscriminate way, or grant exemptions merely for the sake of
legal certainty.54
3. Improved Cooperation between the Commission and
National and International Courts and Authorities in the
Enforcement of Competition Rules
As noted above, under the new approach to Article 85 fewer
agreements would be notified to the Commission. Fewer notifi-
cations would likely lead to an increase in third party complaints,
both to the European Commission and to national competition
authorities ("NAAs"). At the procedural level, this increase
would require the establishment of a strong and well-defined sys-
tem of cooperation amongst all the authorities involved in han-
dling such complaints, including authorities outside Europe.55
52. Regulation No. 1984/83 on exclusive purchasing agreement; Regulation No.
417/85 on specialization agreements; and Regulation No. 418/85 on R&D agreements
will expire on December 31, 1997; whereas Regulation No. 4087/88 on franchise agree-
ments as well as Regulation No. 1983/83 on exclusive distribution agreements will ex-
pire on December 31, 1999.
53. As was the case, for example, for Commission Regulation No. 240/96, OJ. L
31/2 (1996) (Technology Transfer Block Exemption), whose white list under Article 2
is considerably longer than the white lists in Article 2 of the earlier Regulations No.
2349/84 on patent licensing agreements and No. 556/89 on know-how licensing agree-
ments. See Commission Regulation No. 240/96, O.J. L 31/2 (1996); Commission Regu-
lation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15 (1984); Commission Regulation No. 556/89, Oj. L
61/1 (1989).
54. See Recital 18 and Article 2(2) of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption.
Commission Regulation No. 240/96, supra note 52, art. 2(2), O.J. L 31/2 (1996).
55. In the field of international cooperation there were, for example, from July 1,
1996 to December 31, 1996, no fewer than 18 notifications of merger cases by the Euro-
pean Commission to the U.S. authorities and 9 notifications of non-merger cases. In
the same period, there were 9 notifications of merger cases by the U.S. authorities to
the European Commission, and 3 notifications of non-merger cases. See Commission
Report on the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and
the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of their
Competition Laws COM (97) 346 Final (July 1997).
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Within Europe, it may, in particular, become necessary for
the Commission to assist in coordinating NAA actions. For ex-
ample, assistance may be required where an NAA, in the course
of an investigation under Article 85 or its national competition
provisions, establishes that allegedly anti-competitive conduct
may have an impact in another Member State. The Commission
could assist principally by providing information, obtained in
other proceedings, about the undertakings under investigation
by the NAA.
In such a circumstance, an important procedural require-
ment would be that an NAA, which obtains relevant information
from the Commission, should be empowered to use such infor-
mation in order to prove the alleged infringement of Article 85
that are the subject of its proceedings. Such a power would nat-
urally be subject to the obligation, provided for by Article 20 (2)
of Regulation 17, not to disclose information "of the kind cov-
ered by the obligation of professional secrecy."
This position was endorsed by the Commission in the Span-
ish Banks case. 6 Moreover, in a recent judgment, Postbank NV v.
Commission,57 the Court of First Instance, ruled that
the principle of sincere cooperation inherent in Article 5 of
the Treaty requires the Community institutions, and above all
the Commission, which is entrusted with the task of ensuring
application of the provisions of the Treaty, to give active
assistance to any national judicial authority dealing with an
infringement of Community rules. That assistance, which
takes various forms, may, where appropriate, consist in dis-
closing to national courts documents acquired by the institu-
tions in the discharge of their duties.58
It is unclear to what extent this judgment of the Court of
56. See Direcci6n de Defensa de la Competencia v. Asociati6n Espafiola de Banca
Privada, Case C-67/91, [1980] E.C.R. 1-4785, 1-4812 [hereinafter Spanish Banks]. This
case, which arose from an Article 177 reference from the Spanish Tribunal for the
Defence of Competition, provided the Court with the first occasion to discuss for what
purposes a competent NAA can use information provided by one or more undertakings
to the Commission in response to a request for information pursuant to Article 11, or
in notifications made pursuant to Articles 2, 4 or 5 of Regulation 17/62, in national
proceedings. Id.
57. Postbank NV v. Commission, Case T-353/94, [1996] E.C.R. 11-921, [1997] 4
C.M.L.R 33.
58. Id. at 945, 64, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 37.
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First Instance alters the previous ruling of the Court ofJustice, in
the Spanish Banks case, which rules that
such information cannot be relied on by the authorities of
the Member States either in a preliminary investigation pro-
cedure or tojustify a decision based on provisions of competi-
tion law, be it national law or Community law. Such informa-
tion must remain internal to those authorities and may be
used only to decide whether or not it is appropriate to initiate
a national procedure. 59
The Court of Justice reasoned that, notwithstanding the fact
that Article 10(1) of Regulation 17 envisages the transmission of
information collected by the Commission to NAAs, the purpose
of this provision is to inform the Member States of any Commis-
sion proceedings concerning companies located in other territo-
ries, and to promote the collection of information by the Com-
mission, by enabling NAAs to make observations. According to
the Court, "the mere disclosure of such information to the Mem-
ber States does not, of itself, mean that they may use it under
conditions which would undermine the application of Regula-
tion No 17 and the fundamental rights of undertakings."60 How-
ever,
the very view that the use of information obtained by the
Commission in antitrust proceedings conducted by NAAs
would amount to a 'use for other ends' within the meaning of
Article 20 of Regulation 17 seems unreasonably formalistic to
the extent that, no matter who the enforcer in a specific case
is, that information is used for the purpose of applying the
same set of rules, except for rules governing the imposition of
sanctions."
4. Further Development of Informal Settlement of Cases
In adopting a rule of reason approach, the Commission
should develop its current policy of adopting a relatively small
number of formal decisions, under Regulation 17, in selected
cases of great importance for the development of European
competition policy. A correspondingly increased number of
59. Id. at 939, 42, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 42.
60. Spanish Banks, [1980] E.C.R. at 1-4832, 34.
61. Siragusa, supra note 33, at 13-14.
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cases should be settled in informal ways, particularly through
comfort letters.
As noted above, comfort letters are not at present legally
binding. The smooth functioning of the proposed system would
be greatly aided if DG-IV were able to issue "formal" comfort/
discomfort letters. It is clear that a letter signed by a Director of
DG-IV may amount to a decision within the purview of Article
189 of the EC Treaty.6 2 In developing the comfort letter proce-
dure, DG-IV should first direct its efforts towards supporting its
letters with a fully reasoned opinion. Second, the Commission
should draw on its two Notices on. procedures for applications
for negative clearance6" and notifications,64 which provide that
the essential contents of notified agreements should be routinely
published in the Official Journal in order to invite comments
from third parties.65
If the European courts were willing to endorse these, and
possibly further adjustments in the Commission's enforcement
methods, a system based on the rule of reason would develop in
time. This system would provide businessmen, lawyers, and na-
tional courts and competition authorities with both security and
a practical framework for analysis.66
CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE RULE OF
REASON APPROACH
As noted above, a redrafting of the European competition
rules would be entirely unnecessary to bring about important
changes in the current application of EC competition law. The
changes proposed here may be achieved through a gradual shift
62. British American Tobacco and RJ Reynolds v. Commission,Joined Cases 142 &
156/84 , [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24. Formal comfort letters would be-
come subject to judicial review under Article 173 of the Treaty. See Bureau European
Des Unions Des Consommateurs v. Commission, Case T-37/92, [1994] E.C.R. 11-285,
[1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 167.
63. Commission Notice, O.J. C 343/4 (1982) (concerning application procedures
for negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 of Council Regulation No. 17/62).
64. Commission Notice, O.J. C 295/6 (1983) (concerning notification procedures
pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation No. 17/62(1)).
65. In the Commission's view, "[t]he legal certainty provided by a comfort letter is
even stronger if a notice has been published pursuant to Regulation 17, Article 19(3),
which has not elicited adverse comments from third parties." Green Paper, supra note
21, COM (96) 721 at 56, 190.
66. Id. at 56, 190.
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in the Commission's economic appraisal of agreements from Ar-
ticle 85(3) to Article 85(1). The feasibility of this approach is
confirmed by the position sometimes adopted by the European
courts in interpreting Article 85(1). In this respect, the Euro-
pean courts have, on several occasions, adopted a less narrow
and systematic, more economically-based approach, than the
Commission.6" As two commentators stated, the case law of the
European courts
reveals two ways in which the rule of reason can be applied.
The first, established in a line of cases from Technique Mini~re
to Delimitis, applies a rule of reason by stressing that thorough
analysis of the economic context surrounding the agreement
and the effect of the agreement in the relevant market is nec-
essary to determine whether the obligations are anti-competi-
tive to any significant extent. The second approach, adopted
in cases from Metro I to Pronuptia, focuses more on the terms
of the agreement itself, so that if on balance the economic
advantages of the agreement mean that the agreement can be
seen to be pro-competitive overall, any restrictions which are
essential to the performance of the agreement fall outside Ar-
ticle 85(1).6"
By way of conclusion, these two practical applications of the
rule of reason are now discussed, and illustrations are given.
These cases demonstrate the feasibility of the Commission fol-
lowing the European courts' approach, and similarly adopting a
rule of reason.
67. See e.g., Socitc Technique Minire, [1966] E.C.R. at 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 357;
Brasserie de Haecht, [1973] E.C.R. at 77, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 287; V61k v. Vervaecke, Case
5/69, [1969] E.C.R. 295, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273; Metro, [1977] E.C.R. at 1905, [1978] 2
C.M.L.R. at 1; Remia, [1985] E.C.R. at 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1; Co6peratieve
Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek, Case 61/80, [1981] ECR 851, 867, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 240;
Nungesser, [1982] E.C.R. at 2068-69, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 278; Coditel, [1982] E.C.R. at
3401-02, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 49; AEG v. Commission, Case 107/82, [1983] E.C.R.
3151, 3194, [1984] C.M.L.R. 325; BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken v. Commission, Case 35/83,
[1985] E.C.R. 363, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 470; Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis, Case 161/
84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, 381, 388-89, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414; Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hes-
bignonne, Case 27/87, [1988] E.C.R. 1919, 1938-39, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576; Delimitis,
[1991] E.C.R. at 1-935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 210; Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforeninger v.
Dansk Landbrugs Growareselskab, Case C-250/92, [1994] ECR 1-5641, [1996] 4
C.M.L.R. 191; Langnese-Iglo v. Commission, Case T-7/93, [1995] ECR 11-1533, [1995]
C.M.L.R. 602..
68. BELLAMY & CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 68-69 (4th ed.,
1993).
RETHINKING ARTICLE 85
A. Rule of Reason Applied to Interpret Context of Agreement
As noted above, the European courts have often stressed
that a thorough analysis of both the economic context and over-
all effect of agreements is necessary to determine whether. re-
strictive obligations are anti-competitive to any significant ex-
tent.
For example, in Brasserie de Haecht, in considering the valid-
ity of a brewery tie agreement, the Court concluded that agree-
ments, in which an undertaking agreed to obtain its supplies
from one undertaking to the exclusion of all others did not "of
their nature" fall within Article 85(1), but might do so if a mar-
ket analysis taking account of other similar agreements disclosed
an appreciable restriction on competition. In this case, the
Court confirmed that in considering whether an agreement has
the effect of restricting competition within the meaning of Arti-
cle 85(1), it is relevant to consider the whole economic context
including, in particular, the existence of other agreements to the
same effect.
Similarly, in Delimitis, the Court of Justice ruled that a
purchasing contract brought advantages to both parties, even
though the contract required the tenant of a bar owned by a
brewery to buy most of the beer sold at the bar from the brewery.
In deciding that such an agreement did not have the object of
restricting competition, the Court ruled that an exclusive
purchasing agreement must be considered in its economic and
legal context to determine whether it contributes significantly to
the foreclosure of the relevant market and hence falls within Ar-
ticle 85(1). In this respect, once the relevant market has been
defined, one has to assess the nature and the importance of the
totality of exclusive purchasing contracts and then examine the
other conditions of the market, including the number and size
of other producers and market saturation. Market share and the
duration of the contracts are also important factors in determin-
ing whether' foreclosure is likely to occur. When the totality of
the agreements does not have the effect of foreclosing the mar-
ket, these agreements do not fall within Article 85(1).69
Thus, the Court of Justice held that before finding that the
agreement, together with other agreements tying other bars to
69. Delimitis, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-984, 14 - 33, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 210.
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one brewer or another, had the effect of restricting competition,
a national court should inquire whether the agreements would
in fact foreclose other brewers. The Court of Justice said that
this would be the case only if it were difficult to open new bars,
and if so many were tied to one brewer or another for so long
that there were no real and concrete opportunities for a new
brewer to enter or for an existing one to expand. Moreover,
even if the aggregate effect of many ties to different brewers
does foreclose, it is only those agreements that make a substan-
tial contribution to foreclosure that are void. This may be
judged by both the market share of the supplier or the duration
of the ties. The Court of First Instance recently followed the ap-
proach suggested by the Court of Justice.7"
B. Rule of Reason Applied to Interpret Terms of Contract
The second example of the Court's application of the rule
of reason approach is its use of the ancillary restraints doctrine
in interpreting the terms of particular potentially anti-competi-
tive agreements.
On the basis of a broad interpretation of the ancillary re-
straints doctrine, the Court has considered that a large number
of restrictive clauses escape Article 85(1). The Court often
clears restraints necessary to make viable a transaction that is
not, in itself, anti-competitive, but which contains restrictive ele-
ments. The Court has held, for example, that exclusive distribu-
tion agreements and exclusive license agreements are not
caught by Article 85(1) where they are necessary to enable the
penetration of an undertaking into a new market.
In Nungesser, for example, in determining whether there
was a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article
85(1), the Court of Justice looked at the economic nature and
consequences of the conduct involved. The Court concluded
that certain territorial exclusivity provisions in patent licenses
favor the introduction and exploitation of new technologies.7"
70. See Langnese-Iglo, [1995] E.C.R. at 11-1533, [1995] C.M.L.R. at 602.
71. The Court of Justice stated that
In case of a license of breeders's rights over hybrid maize seeds newly devel-
oped in one Member State, an undertaking established in another Member
State which was not certain that it would not encounter competition from
other licensees for the territory granted to it, or from the owner of the right
himself, might be deterred from the risk of cultivating and marketing that
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Licensees would not be willing to take the necessary risks if they
were not assured of this degree of exclusivity.
The Court used this analysis, which the Commission has tra-
ditionally accepted but relegated to Article 85(3), to reach the
conclusion that these provisions were not caught by Article
85(1). The Court of Justice distinguished between (i) an open
exclusive license, whereby the licensor merely agrees not to li-
cense anyone else for the same territory and not to compete with
the licensee; and (ii) a protected exclusive license, whereby the
parties go further and take contractual and other measures to
prevent all competition from parallel importers or licensees in
other territories. In sum, in Nungesser, the Court seems to be
saying that an exclusive right does not "of its nature" fall within
Article 85(1) where the grant of such a right is essential to the
penetration of a new market by the distributor or licensee.
Finally, the Pronuptia case also bears indications of a rule of
reason approach. In that case a franchisee shopowner was re-
quired, inter alia, to use the Pronuptia name and sell Pronuptia
goods only in the shops specified in each agreement and to ob-
tain its requirements of wedding and other dresses from the
franchisor or suppliers nominated by him.
The Court considered that restraints that were prerequisites
to the functioning of the franchise system did not constitute "re-
strictions of competition" within the meaning of Article 85(1).
The Court held that the first such prerequisite was for the
franchisor to be able to transfer his know-how and methods to
the franchisee without running the risk that he was aiding a com-
petitor. As the transfer of intellectual property rights is vital to
the franchising exercise, it is legitimate for a franchisor to im-
pose terms on a franchisee to protect these rights. The second
prerequisite identified by the Court was for the franchisor to be
able to preserve the identity and the reputation of the network
by imposing common standards on all franchisees The prohibi-
tions on the franchisee that were justified on these grounds fell
outside Article 85(1).
Having first stated that a franchise system of the kind in
product; such a result would be damaging to the dissemination of a new tech-
nology and would prejudice competition in the Community between the new
product and similar eXisting products.
Nungesser, [1982] E.C.R. at 2069, 1 58, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 278.
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question was in itself not restrictive of competition, having ad-
vantages for both parties and enabling new markets to be estab-
lished, the Court thus concluded that restrictions seeking to
maintain common standards and to protect intellectual property
were not within Article 85(1) at all.
